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ABSTRACT:
This article considers from an ethical perspective the role that auction
houses play as facilitators of the illicit antiquity trade. It reviews the laws
that regulate the antiquity auction industry and explains why they fail to
prevent the trade in illegally excavated and exported cultural property. This
article argues that auction houses should develop policies focused on ethics
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instead of regulatory compliance, explains why this would better further
cultural preservation interests and protect creator cultures, and looks at
potential business benefits of an ethical model.
I. INTRODUCTION
For two decades, academic discussion and popular articles alike have
argued for stricter government regulation of auctions to help curb the illicit
trade in antiquities.' Despite government response and auction industry
cooperation, the illicit trade in cultural property and archaeological remains
thrives.2 The auction houses try to comply with cultural property laws, and
voluntarily implement internal policies to manage risk. Yet they simply
cannot escape their reputation as the reigning perpetuators of the illicit trade
in cultural property.3 Despite the best efforts of the auction houses, the
auction industry is still causally responsible for the cultural crisis of the
flourishing black market in antiquities.4
Meanwhile, in the global business community, interest in business ethics
has been steadily increasing.5 This trend should inspire auction houses to
reevaluate the strategies they employ to reduce facilitation of the illicit trade
in cultural property. Solutions up to this point have focused almost
exclusively on regulatory compliance. The focus on legal initiatives,
however, has unnecessarily obscured the importance of ethical considerations
arising out of the illicit antiquity trade. I argue that if auction houses develop
internal policies motivated by ethical considerations, supplementing those
focused on regulatory compliance, they will more effectively stem the illicit
trade and receive incidental business benefits.
In advancing this thesis, I argue in Part II of this article that many
proposed legal solutions are inherently flawed and ineffective because
1. See generally Paige L. Margules, Note, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and
Export of Cultural Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 609 (1992).
2. See generally PETER WATSON & CECILIA TODESCHINI, THE MEDICI CONSPIRACY: THE
ILLICIT JOURNEY OF LOOTED ANTIQUITIES FROM ITALY'S TOMB RAIDERS TO THE WORLD'S GREATEST
MUSEUMS (2006).
3. See generally Stephen Farrell & Dalya Alberge, Sotheby's Cuts Antiquity Sales Over
"Smuggling," THE TIMES (LONDON), July 19, 1997, at 1. See also Julie Rickerd, Revealing the Rot of a
Venerable Auction House, THE FINANCIAL POST, Feb. 21, 1998, § 3, at R5.
4. See Chauncey D. Steele IV, Note, The Morgantina Treasure: Italy's Quest for
Repatriation of Looted Artifacts, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 667, 683 (2000). See generally
PETER WATSON, SOTHEBY'S: THE INSIDE STORY (Random House, Inc. 1997).
5. Consider the birth of Corporate Social Responsibility. Many leading corporations, from
McDonalds to Coca-Cola, are now considering the impact of their business practices on society and the
planet as a whole. Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives take forms from statements of policy to
active programs to mitigate the damages of production.
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compliance with foreign cultural property laws does not necessarily further
the goal of cultural preservation and may, in some instances, work against
protecting creator cultures. I provide a background about the law and the
antiquity industry and present an overview of the laws designed to curb the
illicit trade in cultural property. I then explain why these laws have failed
to adequately address the cultural crises caused by the illicit trade.
In Part III, I argue that auction houses should develop ethical strategies
which supplement legal strategies, because doing so would help manage the
risks of liability and bad press, and restore their brand images. I explain
why cultural preservation and protection of creator cultures are ethically
worthy pursuits, and explore the emergence of ethical initiatives in the
antiquity auction industry. The theme of Part III is the underlying tension
between legal and ethical approaches.
Finally, in Part IV I conclude that for as long as the auction houses
define their ethical behavior by way of their legal obligations, they will
continue to facilitate the illicit trade in antiquities, failing to comprehend-
sively manage avoidable risks or improve their brand images.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, I look at current regulatory efforts to stem the illicit
trade in antiquities, including domestic and international laws. The auction
houses hold the majority of their antiquity sales in the United States and the
United Kingdom, and as such, special attention is given to these market
nations.6 I then explain why the current legal framework fails to stop the
illicit trade in antiquities, or to adequately address injuries that creator
cultures suffer because of the illicit trade.
A. Concern in the Antiquity Auction Industry Over the Illicit Trade
The late twentieth-century saw a surge in academic interest in the
illicit trade in antiquities. Scholars demanded that auction houses, which
had thus far operated largely unchecked, carry heavier burdens to help end
the illicit trade in cultural property. Propositions put forth included a
heightened standard of care for the investigation of object origins,7
reporting requirements of the same level as those imposed on museums,
6. Market nations are those in which antiquities are sold. Source nations are where the
cultural artifacts originate. See Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a
Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 385 (1995).
7. See Julia A. McCord, Note, The Strategic Targeting of Diligence: A New Perspective on
Stemming the Illicit Trade in Art, 70 IND. L.J. 985, 1002-07 (1995); Brenna Adler, Comment, The
International Art Auction Industry: Has Competition Tarnished its Finish?, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
433,444 (2003) (quoting Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461,467 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
8. See McCord, supra note 7, at 1004.
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and suspension of the ability for auction houses to require buyers to
contractually disclaim rules of warranty under the UCC.9 Each of these
propositions demanded that the government enact legislation regulating the
antiquity auction industry.
There were several high profile cases in the late twentieth-century that
brought the illicit trade in cultural property to the forefront in the news and
academic discussion. The controversy surrounding Greece's request for
Britain to return the Elgin Marbles underscored nationalist concerns over
cultural property issues.' The Greek Orthodox Church filed suit to prevent
Christie's from auctioning off the Archimedes Palimpsest manuscript in
1998." In 1995, Swiss police sealed four warehouses in Geneva owned by
Giacomo Medici, the suspected mastermind behind an extensive operation
which smuggled looted artifacts out of Italy.12
Meanwhile, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects 3 responded to growing concerns in the inter-
national community about the illicit trade, and attempted to give force to
foreign patrimony statutes. 14  Only a handful of states, however, have
9. William W. Stuart, Authenticity ofAuthorship and the Auction Market, 54 ME. L. REV. 71,
74(2002).
10. John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881, 1908
(1985).
11. See Greek Orthodox Patriarchate v. Christie's, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 13257
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). See also Richard B. Cunningham, The Archimedes Palimpsest, in ARCHAEOLOGY,
RELICS, AND THE LAW 506-20 (Richard B. Cunningham, 2d ed. 2005).
12. See WATSON, supra note 4, at 290-91.
13. See generally International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT):
Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the
International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322.
14. See NEIL BRODIE ET AL., STEALING HISTORY: THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL
MATERIAL 8, 31 (2000). On the subject of patrimony statutes, the authors explain:
Some countries have taken certain categories of material, most notably antiquities
and palaeontological material, into state ownership. Illegal export of this state
property is then considered theft. As theft is a generally recognized criminal
offence it is in the interests of all countries to act against it, so the police of one
country may take action to recover material stolen from another, and expect their
efforts to be reciprocated in return. Inevitably, there are problems here also. A
government might take its country's cultural heritage into state ownership by
passing a patrimony statute, but such a statute will not be recognised inter-
nationally as having a retrospective effect. Thus material removed from a state
before the passing of a statute cannot be claimed as stolen. As the majority of
material traded illicitly is removed illegally, and therefore secretly, it is very
difficult to show that it was removed after the enactment of a patrimony statute,
and didn't in fact leave the country some time long ago.
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signed the Convention, and the marked increase in national patrimony
statutes has diluted the general character of patrimony claims.
In 2000, a scandal about price-fixing in the auction industry shifted
public scrutiny from the houses' involvement in the illicit antiquity trade to
potential violations of antitrust laws.'" Although pressure for reform of
auction industry practices to stem the illicit trade has largely abated, illegal
trafficking in cultural property remains a lucrative black market, earning an
estimated $4.5 billion per year. 16 That makes it the second most profitable
black market, following only drug trafficking.' 7
Auction houses, like realtors, are sales agents for their clients. This
relationship often forecloses liability for facilitating the illicit trade.'
8
Efforts to stem the illicit trade in market nations often focus on due dili-
gence requirements, 9 but these requirements apply to buyers and sellers,
not to their agents. When an auction house auctions an item, it is not
offering the object for sale but, instead, whatever state of title that the
current owner holds.2 ° Sellers are often not forthcoming with information
that will prevent the auction house from listing their item.21 Auction houses
are only legally responsible for trafficking in illicit antiquities if the house
has knowledge that the title is defective (i.e., that the item is of disputed
legitimacy).
B. The Current Model: International and Domestic Laws Designed to
Curb the Illicit Trade in Antiquities
The first international convention on the subject of cultural property
was the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, adopted in 1954 as a response to Nazi looting of
15. See generally CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE ART OF THE STEAL: INSIDE THE SOTHEBY'S-
CHRISTIE'S AUCTION HOUSE SCANDAL (2004).
16. See Christine Adler & Kenneth Polk, The Illicit Traffic in Asian Antiquities (unpublished
paper presented at the Australian Registrar's Committee Conference), available at
http://www.savingantiquities.org/pdf/Asian.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
17. See id. See also Aisha Labi & Simon Robinson, Looting Afrtica: Theft, Illicit Sales,
Poverty and War Are Conspiring to Rob a Continent of Its Rich Artistic Heritage, 31 TIME PACIFIC,
Aug. 6, 2001, available at http://www.time.com/time/pacific/magazine/20010806/art.html (last visited
Oct. 17, 2007).
18. See Aaron M. Boyce, Note, A Proposal to Combat the Illegal Trafficking of Pre-
Columbian Artifacts, 3 HiSP. L.J. 91, 102-03 (1997).
19. See generally Stephen L. Foutty, Recent Development, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence
Requirement in Replevin Actions for Stolen Art, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1839 (1990).
20. See Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 HOW. L.J.
17,21 (1993).
21. Consider the discussion of the Roman bust in Part III of this article.
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artwork.22 This convention has garnered substantial international support,
currently boasting 116 state parties. Because neither the United States nor
the United Kingdom has signed the Hague Convention, it does not affect
the antiquity auction industry in these two primary market nations.
Another international agreement with limited applicability is the
UNIDROIT Convention, which entered into effect in 1995.24 This Conven-
tion attempts to give more force to the domestic patrimony laws of source
nations.25  However, it has failed to generate the support anticipated, and
only twenty-eight state parties have contracted to the agreement.26  The
major market nations of the United States and United Kingdom have not, so
the agreement has no impact on auction houses operating in those market
nations.
Compare the broader success of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, which was a more general attempt to
curb the illicit trade in cultural property.27 The United States and the United
Kingdom are among the over 100 state parties to the treaty.28 The language
in the UNESCO Convention is broad and vague, and definitive language
from implementation is required for effective legislation.
The U.S. Congress implemented the UNESCO Convention in 1983 by
enacting the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
(CCPIA).29 When foreign governments face urgent need to stop looting of
archaeological sites in their home countries, the CCPIA enables the
22. See U.N. Educ. Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention
1954, The Hague, May 14, 1954, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-1, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
23. UNESCO, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, The Hague, May 14, 1954,
http'//erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13637&languagce=E (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
24. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROm: Final Act of the
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International
Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322.
25. See Adler, supra note 7, at 460.
26. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Convention on
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.pdf (last
visited Jun. 6, 2007).
27. UNESCO, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris, Apr. 24, 1972, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, art. 1.
28. UNESCO, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris, Nov. 14, 1970, List of the 102 State
Parties, available at http./www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html eng/page3.shtml (last visited June
6, 2007).
29. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, arts. 1, 1I, Nov. 14, 1970, 806 U.N.T.S. 234-36.
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government to make emergency bilateral agreements for import restrictions.
Agreements made pursuant to the CCPIA oblige state parties to prevent the
importation of artifacts stolen from other nations, and to aid in the return of
looted cultural objects. It authorizes the U.S. government to seize stolen
cultural property from potentially faultless private parties. If an auction
house is offering a cultural object for sale, which a foreign party alleges is
the subject of an agreement or restriction made under the CCPIA, then the
state Attorney General's Office may compel the house to hold the item,
until it is determined whether the object is subject to seizure.
The United States currently has active bilateral agreements 30 enacted
pursuant to the CCPIA with Bolivia,31 Cambodia,32 Colombia,
33 Cyprus, 3 4
El Salvador, 35 Guatemala,36 Honduras,37 Italy,38 Mali,39 Nicaragua,40 and
Per6.4 While the precise terms of each agreement differ, generally, they
provide for emergency bans of particular classes of objects which have been
30. For an up-to-date list of current and expired import restrictions, see U.S. State Department,
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Chart of Emergency Actions and Bilateral Agreements,
available at http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/chart.html (last visited June 11, 2006).
31. Archaeological and Ethnological Material from Bolivia, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,490-99 (Dec. 7,
2001).
32. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Materials From Cambodia, 19 C.F.R. § 12
(2003).
33. Memorandum of Understanding Between The Government of the United States of
America and The Government of the Republic of Colombia Concerning the Imposition of Import
Restrictions on Archaeological Materials From the Pre-Columbian Cultures and Certain Ecclesiastical
Material from the Colonial Period of Colombia. See Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain
Archaeological and Ethnological Materials From Colombia, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,757-66 (Mar. 17, 2006).
34. Import Restrictions Imposed on Pre-Classical and Classical Archaeological Material
Originating in Cyprus, 67 Fed. Reg. 47,447-50 (July 19, 2002). See also Import Restrictions Imposed
on Byzantine Ecclesiastical and Ritual Ethnological Material from Cyprus, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,529-31
(Apr. 12, 1999).
35. Pre-Hispanic Artifacts from El Salvador, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,352-61 (Mar. 10, 1995).
36. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Artifacts From Guatemala, 62 Fed. Reg.
51,771-74 (Oct. 3, 1997).
37. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Honduras, 69 Fed.
Reg. 12,267-71 (Mar. 16,2004).
38. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy and
Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,399-02 (Jan. 23,
2001).
39. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Artifacts from Mali, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,594-
97 (Sept. 23, 1997).
40. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material From the Pre-Hispanic Cultures
of the Republic of Nicaragua, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,140-42 (Oct. 26, 2000).
41. Archaeological and Ethnological Material From Peru, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,713-21 (June 11,
1997).
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looted or illegally exported in bulk. Again, these bilateral agreements
incidentally affect auction houses when property up for auction is
recognized as subject to restriction.
The United States and Mxico, for instance, entered into a bilateral
agreement focusing on the protection of cultural property in 1970.42 The
agreement provides for the return of stolen artifacts of historic and national
importance, and for each country to use all legal means to return a protected
artifact upon request.43 The primary aim of this treaty is to protect Mexican
cultural property. The categories of objects protected are very broad, and
include pre-Columbian as well as colonial artifacts.
44
In this treaty, the United States and Mexico agree to recognize each
other's sovereign claims of ownership of certain cultural property. In U.S.
v. McClain, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized
Mkxico's 1972 claim of ownership to all archaeological material as valid.
45
In McClain, the government prosecuted defendants under the National
Stolen Property Act of 1934 (NSPA) for their unauthorized exportation of
pre-Columbian artifacts which fell under Mxico's broad claim of owner-
ship. The McClain court held that authorities may prosecute smugglers for
dealing in stolen goods under NSPA when they illegally export an artifact
out of a source nation with a controlling patrimony law declaring the
property to be government property.46
42. Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural
Properties, U.S.-Mex., July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494 [hereinafter U.S.-Mdxico Treaty].
43. See Boyce, supra note 18, at 121.
44. For instance, Art. I of the treaty defines the property covered as:
(a) art objects and artifacts of the pre-Columbian cultures of the United States of America
and the United Mexican States of outstanding importance to the national patrimony,
including stelae and architectural features such as relief and wall art;
(b) art objects and religious artifacts of the colonial periods of the United States of America
and the United Mexican States of outstanding importance to the national patrimony;
(c) documents from official archives for the period up to 1920 that are of outstanding
historical importance: that are the property of federal, state, or municipal governments or
their instrumentalities, including portions or fragments of such objects, artifacts, and
archives.
See U.S.-Mdxico Treaty, supra note 42, art. 1; Compare the broad category of objects covered in the
U.S.-Mixico Treaty to the narrow category of protected artifacts from Mali. "Archaeological material
from sites in the region of the Niger River Valley and the Bandiagara Escarpment (Cliff), Mali, dating
from approximately the Neolithic period to approximately the 18th century .... .. See Import
Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Artifacts from Mali, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,594-95 (Sept. 23, 1997).
45. U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (1977).
46. Id. at 996.
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This holding was applied in the more recent case of US. v. Schultz. 47
In Schultz, the defendant dealer sold Egyptian antiquities which had been
illegally exported. One deal involved an Egyptian head sculpture which he
sold to a collector for $1.2 million. While Defendant knew that the head
was illegally exported out of Egypt in 1991, he told the buyer it had been in
a private collection since the 1920s.48 Because Egypt passed a law in 1983
laying claim to all antiquities, at the time the head was exported without
authorization in 1991, it was being stolen from the nation of Egypt.
49
Defendant was successfully prosecuted for dealing in stolen property under
NSPA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
conviction citing McClain.5" As a result, if auction house employees were
to knowingly5 deal in illegally exported or stolen antiquities, they could be
criminally prosecuted under NSPA. Arguably, this may in fact have the
opposite effect intended, motivating auction house employees not to make
unnecessary inquiries which may give them knowledge of their involve-
ment in an illicit sale.
In addition to the domestic laws enacted pursuant to the UNESCO
convention, there are three laws Congress has enacted to address the cultural
property crisis in the United States. Specifically, the Antiquities Act of 1906,
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA) and the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA).
In 1906 Congress enacted the Antiquities Act to protect archaeological
resources on federal and tribal lands.52 It permits up to a $500.00 fine and a
maximum of ninety days imprisonment for anyone who attempts to "appro-
priate, excavate, injure, or destroy" any potential "object of antiquity. 53
Until ARPA, this was the primary mechanism protecting Native American
cultural property, but it did not protect cultural property found on private
lands.54 ARPA increased the penalties from the Antiquities Act, and
specifically dealt with human remains.55 In NAGPRA, Congress explicitly
recognized the property rights of Native Americans over cultural property
47. U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2003).
48. Id. at 396; Tales of previously unheard of private collections, grandmothers' attics, and
dusty basements are common ones in antiquities dealing.
49. See U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398-99.
50. Id. at 403.
51. See The National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1934) (includes a mens rea
requirement of "knowing" the item to have been stolen).
52. See American Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1988).
53. See Stephanie Ann Ades, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act: A New
Application in the Private Property Context, 44 CArT. U. L. REv. 599,604-05 (1995).
54. Id. at 604.
55. See Kelly E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation, 25 J. LAND
REsOURCES & ENvTL. L. 259,265 (2005).
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found in burial sites on federal and tribal lands, and criminalized trafficking
in Native American remains and cultural items.56 These three domestic
cultural property laws are narrow in scope, and protect only Native
American cultural property and human remains found on federal lands or
tribal lands. If a tribe makes a claim on an item that is up for auction, it can
certainly be confiscated. Further, if a transaction is partially completed, the
auction house may be required to reverse parts of it or refund price paid in
order to facilitate proper resolution of a conflict.
The European Union's (EU) unique political system facilitates broader
regulation of the illicit antiquity trade than those of the United States and
United Kingdom. For instance, the European Union Directive on the
Return of Cultural Objects 57 (Directive) provides for the return of archaeo-
logical objects which have been unlawfully removed from a member state
of the EU. To qualify, objects must be "national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archaeological value.,,58 They must fall in one of the
listed categories of artifacts, or form an integral part of a public collection.
The Directive defines unlawful removal as breach of the rules in force in
the territory from which the object was removed, or in breach of the
conditions of temporary authorization. The Directive applies to all
countries in the EU, permitting broad, consistent regulation, and operates as
an automatic international agreement amongst all the members of the EU.
In addition to the Directive, domestic laws governing the importation
of art in the EU impose further restrictions on the trade of antiquities. Great
Britain, for instance, adopted the Dealing in Cultural Objects Act in
December 2003. 59 This act makes it illegal to knowingly handle an object
which was illegally removed from its site after 2003, but does not require
due diligence in discovering an object's origin.60
Thus far, domestic regulations and international agreements on cultural
property have had only an incidental impact on the operations of auction
houses. To the extent which possessors of cultural property are sometimes
56. See Will R. Ripley, You're Not Native American-You're Too Old! Bonnichsen v. United
States Exposes the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
137, 142 (2005).
57. See Council Directive 93//EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 74), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0007:EN:HTML (last visited Oct. 17,
2007).
58. Id. art. 1.
59. See Dealing in Cultural Objects Act, 2003, ch. 27 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2003/ukpga_20030027-en-I (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
60. See John Windsor, Ancient and Modern Make Perfect Match, Antiquities are Now Sought
After by Interior Designers as Fashionable - and Affordable - Art, THE OBSERvER, Jun. 6, 2004,
available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/cash/story/0,6903,1232178,00.htnl (last visited Oct. 3,
2007).
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required to relinquish claim to items, only the titleholders suffer economic
loss. An auction house may be inconvenienced by being required to hold
an item subject to dispute resolution, or embarrassed if the press portrays it
in a bad light. Otherwise, auction houses face little to no negative
consequences for being the single largest facilitators of the illicit trade in
cultural property.
C. Weaknesses in the Current Model: Why Laws Fail to Prevent the
Trade in Illicit Antiquities or to Adequately Address Injury to Creator
Cultures
As stated above, auction houses are sales agents for their clients, and
do not hold title to the property they put up for auction.61 Auction houses
solicit potential buyers as a service to the sellers, and facilitate determina-
tion of a fair market price. This business model does not legally justify the
imposition of a heightened standard of investigation regarding the legiti-
macy of consigned items. The sellers are obligated to tell the auction
houses where the objects came from, but there is no legal requirement for
the auction houses to do any external investigation to legitimize the claims.
Unlike in real estate, there is no prevailing title system for antiquities.
Instead, auction houses devise categories of items which have a higher
likelihood of having been illicitly obtained, or subject to import restrictions.
The categories are based on the apparent origin of the objects. If an item
falls within one of these categories, the house requires the seller to provide
paperwork of provenance 62 to show the seller legally obtained the object.
An export license from the source nation is satisfactory. The houses
voluntarily impose these requirements for paperwork of provenance in
order to minimize, first, the likelihood that they are facilitating an illegal
trade, and second, potential claims of foreign governments or private third
parties for items in their care.
61. See Borodkin, supra note 6, at 386. See generally MASON, supra note 15 (providing an in-
depth look at the inner-workings of the auction industry).
62. See Hans Kennon, Take a Picture, it May Last Longer If Guggenheim Becomes the Law of
the Land The Repatriation of Fine Art, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 373, 382-83 n.45 (1996). In note 45,
Mr. Kennon defines provenance as follows:
One commentator noted that "provenance" is a term of art but has varying definitions. "In
DICTIONARY OF THE ARTS (M. Wolfed. 1951), provenance is 'documents, descriptions,
bills, receipts... furnished by the artist when selling a painting... establishing that the work
of art is genuine and not a copy or forgery. . . .' In HUDSON DICTIONARY OF ART
TERMS (E. Lucie-Smith Thames ed. 1984), it is a 'record of all known previous ownership
and locations of a work of art as given in a catalogue raisome."' Jessica L. Darraby, Current
Developments in International Trade of Cultural Property: Duties of Collectors, Traders
and Claimants, in THE LAW AND BusINEss OF ART (Practising Law Institute 1990).
2008)
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
For instance, auction houses require Egyptian items with a purchase
date after 1973 (the year Egypt signed the UNESCO Convention) to have
paperwork of acceptable provenance. If a seller can show the auction house
that they purchased their Egyptian artifact before 1973, they are exempt
from the requirement of showing provenance.
However, it is difficult for an auction house to know when purchase
paperwork is forged or manipulated. This partially explains why studies
repeatedly show that about ninety percent of antiquities auctioned through
the houses are illegally excavated or exported.6 3 However, despite these dis-
tressing figures, the reality is that even if an object was illegally excavated or
exported, it may still be legal to sell it.
If an illegally exported artifact arrives in a market nation which does
not have an international agreement with the source nation to reciprocally
enforce one another's patrimony laws, local law would not prohibit sale of
the item. To illustrate, assume that the fictional country of Nadus has a
national patrimony statute laying claim to all cultural property discovered
after a certain date (this type of law operates as a ban on antiquity exports).
The Nadusean law has no force in the United States unless the two nations
have entered into an international agreement to enforce each other's cultural
property laws. When an illegally exported Nadusean artifact appears on the
United States market, there is no legal prohibition on selling the item, since
the United States has not agreed to enforce Nadus' patrimony laws. 64
The Nadusean artifact hypothetical illustrates that the law exists only
as a concept, to the extent that people believe it exists. By moving an
illegally excavated artifact a few miles west, across country borders, its
status as "illegal" can be cured. For every country in which a person can
trade the item, a separate mechanism of legal enforcement is necessary.
This illustrates one of the primary abstract problems with the movement to
prevent the illicit trade in cultural property: people often conceptually
attach an illegal status to the object itself, which is incorrect and adds con-
fusion to the issue. In reality, the law can only proscribe conduct on the
part of a person, not impose a permanent illegal status on an item.
A tainted item does not carry with it the appearance of having been
illegally obtained or exported, so physical characteristics alone rarely reveal
an object to be the fruit of past illegal acts. An illegally exported Nigerian
terracotta head looks just the same as a legally exported Nigerian terracotta
head. There are burdens on both the buyer and the seller to help address
this challenge, but these require the sellers to be forthcoming, and buyers to
be fastidious in research.
63. See WATSON, supra note 4, at 304. See also Richardo J. Elia, Digging Up Dirt, An
Antiquities Case Unearths Corruption, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Jun. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.opinionjoumal.com/la/?id=! 10001867 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
64. See generally Boyce, supra note 18.
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While the seller is obligated to disclose what he knows of the
provenance of the item, this often does not happen (consider the story of the
Roman bust later in Part III of this article). The buyer, on the other hand, is
required to exercise due diligence, which requires she consult the major
looted and stolen art registries. 65 The Art Loss Registry is widely used, but
far from comprehensive, and illegally excavated objects are not listed
because they are previously unknown.66 These burdens on the buyer and
seller are common to all property transactions and not tailored with the
illicit antiquity market in mind.
In cases where it is legal to sell an object, and detecting whether it was
illegally obtained is nearly impossible, and the burdens on the buyers and
sellers are minimal, where does that leave the auction houses? They are
still the bottleneck through which a substantial percentage of antiquities
pass, 67 and the auction market may in fact be the most efficient place to try
and catch the objects which have been stolen, illegally exported or looted.
The response of the auction houses is that they do not have the resources to
conduct thorough investigations into each consigned object to make sure
the buyers have told them the truth. The duty which auction houses owe to
their clients is merely to promote the consigned objects and care for them
properly.
From a policy perspective, the logistical framework of imposing a
heightened obligation on the auction houses does not conform to the notions
of a property-oriented legal system. Whether auction houses are the only
entities which have the ability to legitimize the market or not (an arguable
notion, but often taken as a given in pro-regulation discussions), the duties
which arise from being a sales agent do not correspond to the perceived
needs of the illicit antiquity trade. While the current laws have proved
inadequate to prevent the trade in illicit antiquities, or to adequately address
injury to creator cultures, an alternative vehicle which can help address
defects in the industry has emerged by way of ethics.
III. AUCTION HOUSE ETHIcs
In recent years the concept of business ethics has received considerable
attention. This notion requires companies become more cognizant of the
impact of their business practices on society as a whole, and many businesses
have made modifications to their operations in order to be more socially
65. See generally Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title
to Valuable Artwork, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 631 (2000).
66. See BRODIE ET AL., supra note 14, at 52. This section of the article relies heavily on this
publication.
67. Thirty to forty percent of all the world's antiquities pass through auction houses, making
this the most public portion of the antiquities market. See WATSON, supra note 4, at 304.
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responsible and ethical. Business ethics turn matters previously handled by
the legal department into those precisely designed for public relations
campaigns to address. This allows businesses to preemptively manage risks
before they become real problems. Business ethics have become more inter-
national in scope and function, and pervasive throughout diverse industries.
The auction industry, however, has not yet embraced the notion of business
ethics. As a starting point it is necessary to define what ethical role auction
houses should assume concerning the illicit antiquity trade.
A. Why Stemming the Illicit Trade is an Ethical Concern: Protecting
Creator Cultures and Preserving Cultural Remains
Cultural preservation is ethically worthy because of the impact cultural
loss has on individuals and communities. When a community loses its
cultural resources to looting and illegal exportation, the cultural lives of its
members suffer. Removal of archaeological remains from a creator culture
robs individuals of their right to cultural heritage.68 The Stockholm
Declaration published by the International Council of Monuments and Sites
(ICOMOS) recognizes the right to cultural heritage as a fundamental human
right.69 The Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of
Cultural Heritage for Society7 ° similarly recognizes the right of people to
cultural heritage. The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples71 goes even further and suggests that indigenous people
should have autonomous control over cultural resources within their local
72territory.
Discovery of cultural artifacts is not just about knowledge and objects,
but also about a reassurance of roots.73 In countries where people are
commonly of mixed ethnographic ancestry, archaeology creates a common
national pride. The past gives people "confidence and a sense of special
68. According to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights are
based in the inherent human dignity. The delineated right that is most relevant to the ethics of cultural
property is the right to participate fully in cultural life. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
69. See Declaration of ICOMOS, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Sep. 11, 1998),
available at http://www.intemational.icomos.org/estocdec.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
70. Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society,
Oct. 27, 2005, arts. 1, 4, C.E.T.S. 199 [hereinafter Framework Convention].
71. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2.1993/29/
AnnexI (Aug. 23, 1993) (prepared by Erica-Irene A. Daes).
72. Id. art. 3.
73. Karl Meyer, The Plundered Past, in ARCHAEOLOGY, RELICS, AND THE LAW 172 (Richard
B. Cunningham, 2d ed. 2005).
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virtue., 74 Further, cultural objects are tangible, easily accessible reminders
of accomplishments.75 For every artifact a creator culture loses to smuggling
or theft, people are denied the pride, virtue, and confidence which would have
resulted from caring for it.76 Archaeologists have argued that taking away
archaeological remains damages the collective psyche of a creator culture,
and steals a part of their identity.77
In some cultures, removal of venerated objects from their traditional
setting is an act of desecration (for example, when temples are defaced to
remove carvings or when tombs are torn apart by looters searching for
treasure). Historically, oppressive dominant cultures have destroyed the
cultural relics of minority cultures to disempower them. One example is the
2001 destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha figures by puritanical Muslims in
Afghanistan.78 When sacred objects are taken away by exportation or
deliberate destruction, in varying degrees, the right of a people to their
cultural heritage is denied.
If people have a fundamental human right to cultural heritage,79 they
should also fairly benefit from their cultural resources. Looters receive
small amounts of money for nonrenewable cultural objects which might
ultimately sell for very high prices.80 The objects are commodified on the
Western market and circulate for many years generating money. None of
this money makes its way back to creator cultures. In this way, the trade in
looted objects undermines a community's economic base, taking away from
the creator culture a nonrenewable resource and the opportunity for sustain-
able profit.
Illegal removal of cultural remains, whether by looting or unauthorized
exportation, also takes away the chance to meaningfully study an artifact. If
74. Id. at 171-72.
75. See generally BRODIE ET AL., supra note 14.
76. Admittedly, creator cultures or source nations are sometimes accused of not taking as good
care of cultural objects as might the owner of an illicit antiquity in a market nation. The ethical concerns
discussed herein outweigh the dangers of inadequate care, largely because it is possible to address this
problem by better educating creator cultures on preservation methods. To permit the "haves" to
continue stripping the "have nots" of cultural resources under the premise that source nations are not
adequately caring for their cultural resources is offensively paternalistic (and reminiscent of the
Manifest Destiny mentality that since the Native Americans were not "using" the land by European
standards that they were not entitled to it).
77. See BRODIE ET AL., supra note 14, at 11-12.
78. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Whose Culture Is It?, 53 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BooKs 2 (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http:/lwww.si.umich.edu/-rfrost/courses/MatCult/content/Appiah,
%20Whose%2OCulture.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
79. Framework Convention, supra note 70, art. 6 (asserting that the right to a cultural heritage
is a fundamental one).
80. See BRODIE ET AL., supra note 14, at 13-14 (citing the example of a fossil turtle purchased
from its finder for $10 in Brazil, later fetching $16,000 when sold in Europe).
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an artifact is inexpertly excavated, the archaeological record of context is
usually damaged or destroyed, often irreparably eliminating the potential
for scholarly learning from its excavation.8' An object's original social
value and purpose may be lost entirely, preventing anthropologists and
archaeologists from adding to their historical knowledge base.82 Further,
when an artifact is removed from its natural surroundings, there is an
increased risk of decay and destruction because of changes in the
environment.
To preemptively excavate and export is to take away the chance for the
people of a creator culture to rediscover their history by way of the lost
context and meaning. In a world where globalization is slowly and
systematically diluting cultural and ethnic differences between populations,
sources of knowledge about a people's past become precious in retaining a
sense of identity. The removal of sacred objects from the care of a creator
culture damages morale because community members lose something
psychologically precious. When the European colonists of North America
wanted to demoralize indigenous people, they stripped them of their native
clothes and cut off their hair. Taking away physical, tangible manifesta-
tions of cultural connections undermines a community's very identity. To
facilitate the trade in objects whose loss demoralizes a people, is to trade in
demoralization itself.
B. The Tension Between Legal and Ethical Frameworks
There is an inherent tension between the law and ethics in arguments
advocating heightened regulation of the auction industry as a way to stem
the illicit trade in cultural property. This tension is borne of the persistent
failure of legal solutions to adequately address the ethical problems of the
illicit antiquities crisis. Arguably, legal regulation may frustrate the ethical
goals of cultural preservation and protection of creator cultures. In foreign
law, culturally insensitive patrimony laws can conflict with the ethical goals
of minority creator cultures. Domestically, the prevailing property model
has proven itself inadequate to protect the interests of those creator cultures
which lack a legally cognizable property interest.
Academic discussion on the illicit antiquity trade often reprimands
parties to illegal transactions on moral grounds. However, the resulting
correlation of legal initiatives with ethical concerns is ill conceived. Source
nation patrimony laws, for instance, do not always protect creator cultures.
Patrimony laws are property laws, and sometimes those laws benefit the
government more than they benefit nationals. Governments sometimes
81. See BRODIE ET AL., supra note 14, at 8, 11.
82. See Christopher Chippindale & David W. J. Gill, Material Consequences of Contemporary
Classical Collecting, 104 AM. J. OF ARCHAEOLOGY 463, 504 (2000).
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draw country borders without regard to the past and present territories of
ethnic groups. Some administrations have no ties to the ethnic groups
which incidentally fall within the country's borders. The interests of a
creator culture can come in direct conflict with the government interests
served by a national patrimony law.83
Viewed in the proper context, the illicit antiquity trade and the un-
ethical antiquity trade become two distinct, partially overlapping categories.
If a national government appropriates cultural property by way of a broad
patrimony law, and the creator culture is not compensated for the taking,
then a legal action may still be unethical. Consider the Holocaust, where
the Nazis expropriated cultural property from Jewish nationals in what
were, according to the reigning regime, legal actions.8
4
Current efforts to curb the illicit trade do not fully consider the
interests of cultural property laws, and the ethics of preservation do not
necessarily coincide. By distinguishing between the legal and ethical
concerns of illicit trade, auction houses can better tailor remedies for both.
Until the houses recognize this distinction, efforts to stem the trade will fail
to adequately protect creator cultures or address the damage caused by the
illicit trade in cultural property.
C. Practical and Business Benefits of a Supplementary Ethical Model
Risk management protects a company's brand name, and sometimes
motivates businesses to develop ethical models for business operations.
The leading auction houses have been working for over 200 years to build
reputations which remain far too fragile in view of how important they are
to business. One corruption scandal can severely mar a company's good
reputation and brand image.85
A representative from one of the major auction houses told me the
story of a Roman bust which was up for auction in the house's New York
location. The seller gave the auction house paperwork indicating the item
was of legitimate provenance. The day before the auction was scheduled to
begin, the Attorney General (A.G.) came to the auction house and said Italy
had filed a repatriation claim on the object. Together the auction house
employees and the A.G. inspected the item. The object appeared to be the
one in photos of a Roman bust stolen from an Italian museum, but there was
paperwork of legitimate provenance on file. The auction house and A.G.
83. See generally Appiah, supra note 78.
84. The art taken from Holocaust victims is today considered "stolen," but it was not stolen
under the local standards of the time. See generally Alia Szopa, Hoarding History: A Survey of
Antiquity Looting and Black Market Trade, 13 U. MIAMi Bus. L. REv. 55 (2004). See also Phelan,
supra note 65.
85. See generally Appiah, supra note 78.
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came to an agreement that the auction could proceed, but the house would
not accept any funds toward the purchase of the item, and would not release
it from their care until the dispute was settled.
When the seller was questioned in further detail as to the provenance
of the bust, he explained he had inherited the item from his father. He
revealed his father had purchased the bust, donated it to a museum, which
was later robbed of the object, and somehow it came back into the father's
possession. The seller surmised that maybe the paperwork showing legiti-
macy was from his father's first acquisition of the object. In that case the
purchase paperwork was in fact legitimate, so, absent Italy's last-minute
repatriation claim, the auction house could not have known about the
sequence of events which rendered the paperwork of good provenance to be
misleading.
8 6
The auction house cooperated fully with the A.G. to help settle the
dispute so the object could be returned to its rightful owner. The bust was
shipped back to Italy, and the A.G. privately applauded the auction house
for their cooperation. He promised that he would say good things about
them in the press release. The representative confessed to me she was
disappointed but not surprised to read the subsequent headline in the New
York Times: "[Name of auction house] Tries to Sell Stolen Bust."
The auction house employees were disappointed that the A.G. and
press painted them as villains despite their best efforts to conduct business
in a legitimate manner, and to cooperate with authorities when a dispute
came up. When the representative recounted the story, she even sounded
hurt. Beyond injuring the morale of the employees, every inflammatory
headline damages the reputation of a company, and mandates public
relations repair the damage.
Auction houses currently focus, almost exclusively, on legal com-
pliance. When I asked one house if they had any sort of corporate social
responsibility policy, the representative was quick to respond, "Our
company tries its very best to enforce the patrimony laws of all source
nations. ''87 In response to a question about the role of ethics in reducing the
86. If the auction house had performed an external investigation, it may have turned up the
bust in one of the stolen art registers. Such an investigation is the duty of the buyer, however. If auction
houses conducted investigations to independently verify every claim made by their sellers, even when
the claims are supported by proper documentation, it would undermine the nature of the agent-client
relationship.
87. If there is no domestic treaty or law effectuating the laws of a source nation, then there is
no legal duty for auction houses to enforce those foreign laws. Meanwhile, many of these patrimony
laws are not tailored to ethical concerns, so it is illogical to comply with them in order to satisfy ethical
demands. It is not entirely clear why auction houses try to enforce the patrimony laws of source nations
when those laws have no legal effect. It is likely that the web of treaties, in effect and out of effect,
combined with the evolving patrimony laws of source nations, make it difficult for auction house
lawyers to track what laws have legal effect at a particular time, and what exactly that legal effect is.
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illicit trade in cultural property, the attorney for a different house
responded, "We comply with all of New York City's auction rules, and
their substantial ethical rules and also the laws for consumer protection."
These answers focus on legal considerations as a substitute for ethical ones,
and fail entirely to acknowledge the difference between the two.
By stressing their devotion to legal compliance when asked about
ethical matters, auction houses are legitimizing the notion that they believe
legal solutions effectively address the social ills of the illicit trade. Even if
an auction house obeys the cultural property laws of every source nation,
including those which are overbroad, published in obscure foreign
languages, or unenforceable in the United States, they may nonetheless
facilitate the illicit trade in cultural property and the resulting social harms.
A strategy based on legal compliance further fails to mitigate the
public perception that the business practices of auction houses are self-
serving and unethical. The auction houses are, inarguably, facilitators of
the illicit antiquity market."8 But if the houses considered cultural
preservation and the protection of creator cultures as important ethical
goals, the public could perceive them as protectors of the public good
instead of enablers of a self-serving, patrician market satisfied with legal
compliance. Therefore, if the auction houses adopt a supplementary ethical
framework, they may also experience the business benefits of a further
reduced risk of liability and an improved brand image in the eyes of the
public.
D. The Emergence of Ethical Strategies in the Antiquity Auction Industry
The major auction houses have responded to public criticism and
growing risk of liability by revising their internal policies to go beyond
local and national regulatory requirements. 89  They have recognized that
88. Many companies, however, enable illicit activity and still evade or escape blame and
public condemnation for it. (E.g., companies that manufacture or distribute rolling papers, gun silencers,
radar detectors, or alcohol.) These companies may, at times, actively flout the law in favor of some
advertised public interest.
Consider the energy drink that was pulled from the market because of pressure from the FDA
over the drink's inflammatory name-"Cocaine." When the drink went back on the shelves, it was
under the name "Censored," poking fun of what they asserted was a violation of free speech rights. This
company used the notion of free speech to align themselves with the public against the administration
over excessive regulation.
The auction houses could create an image for themselves as protectors of the public good by
pitting themselves against the social ills of the illicit market, even when the law is inadequate to protect
the creator cultures or truly serve the interests of cultural preservation.
89. See generally Tony Thomcroft, Art World Gives Tomb Raiders the Cold Shoulder, THE
FiNANCiAL TIMES, May 9,2003, at 21.
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they are the primary facilitators of this quasi-black market.90 Despite the
desire of auction houses to go beyond mere compliance, the demands made
of them by foreign governments are murky, fragmented, and sometimes
impossible to effectuate because of overbreadth. This leaves the auction
houses in a constant struggle to comply with regulations, despite not always
knowing how to comply, and it leaves them at constant risk that any
apparently innocuous transaction could result in unavoidable and damaging
headlines, or even civil liability.9'
There has been substantial debate as to what ethical duty the auction
houses have in investigating beyond what their clients tell them.92
However, it is difficult for them to do so because information on stolen and
illegally exported artifacts is widely dispersed and not always easily
accessible.93 It is difficult for an auction house to discover the origin of a
specific item even if they conduct a thorough investigation.94 Further, the
houses explain that they do not have the resources to run their own
Interpol. 95 Despite high revenues, auction houses have thin profit margins.
Given limited resources, the auction houses argue that the best they can do
is to make thorough inquiries of sellers, require provenance paperwork for
potentially protected items, and publish their catalogs to provide a way for
private and governmental parties to search for specific objects.96
Although there is no legal requirement to do so, the houses publish
catalogs which picture what items are coming up for auction. Christie's
even sends hard copy catalogs to source nations before an auction begins.
This gives the source nations the opportunity to examine photos and search
for missing objects. Christie's also puts upcoming auctions on their website
in a searchable database called LotFinder.97 Similarly, Sotheby's and
90. See Steele, supra note 4, at 668-69.
91. Consider the discussion of the Roman bust in Part III, Section D, of this text.
92. See Appiah, supra note 78.
93. There have been numerous arguments for creating a single, dominant international registry
of stolen and illegally exported art and antiquities, but as of this point there are a lot of different
registries, and the amount of resources required for a country to enter thoroughly searchable details for
every missing object into databases is so substantial as to be impossible for many source nations. See
generally Laura McFarland-Taylor, Tracking Stolen Artworks on the Internet: A New Standard for Due
Diligence, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 937 (1997).
94. See Tarquin Preziosi, Applying a Strict Discovery Rule to Art Stolen in the Past, 49
HASTfNGS L.J. 225,243 (1997).
95. Interpol is an international police organization with 186 member countries. It specializes
in crimes of an international nature, including property crimes (i.e., tracking down stolen art and
antiquities).
96. McFarland-Taylor, supra note 93, at 965-68. See Preziosi, supra note 94, at 243.
97. LotFinder, Christie's, http://www.christies.com/LotFinder/Ifsearchcoa/Search.aspx?
noresults--true (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
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Bonhams have freely accessible web pages where they publish photos of
objects to be sold in upcoming auctions.98
Advance publication of catalogues is one of the many internal policies
auction houses have implemented which go beyond strict legal compliance,
and help manage risk. The houses also demand more documentation of
sellers than is required under law. While much of this voluntary regulation
is intended to avoid legal and public relations problems, a spirit of ethics
has consequently started to emerge.
The Sotheby's Code of Business Conduct and Ethics (Sotheby's Code)
is part of their Corporate Governance paperwork, and available to the public
through the investor relations section of the Sotheby's website. 99 The
Sotheby's Code purports to establish a culture of ethics for employee
actions both internally and externally. With a business-oriented mindset,
Sotheby's directs employees to do what is ethical by obeying all laws. It
encourages "ethical conduct," upholding of "ethical standards," reporting of
"unethical behavior," and the making of "ethical decisions," although it
never defines the term "ethical." However, the Sotheby's Code does
specifically include: compliance with the laws, fair dealing, confidentiality,
conflicts of interest, insider trading, and reporting of illegal behaviors. The
Sotheby's Code speaks of ethical behavior and legal obligations
coextensively, but indicates, as of this point, Sotheby's interest in the
former is largely borne of its responsibility under the latter.
The Sotheby's Code is a curative effort to address previous auction
industry practices. For instance, in a 1997 scandal, news reports accused
Sotheby's of London of knowingly facilitating the illegal looting and
exporting of protected artifacts out of India, Italy, and Egypt.'00 The Times
of London alleged Sotheby's was "actively engaged in flouting the laws of
several countries. ' '  As a result, Sotheby's has modified its antiquity
collection, and only auctions off items of unquestionable provenance in
London.102 If an object does not have established provenance, Sotheby's
will only auction the item out of their New York location.'
03
In speaking with the auction houses and in reviewing the material
available to the public, I was unable to uncover much else in the way of
conscious recognition of ethical obligation on the part of the auction
98. Sotheby's, Catalogue Desk, http://www.sothebys.com/app/live/pub/PubLanding'jsp (last
visited Jun. 11, 2007); Bonharns, Catalogue Subscriptions, http://www.bonhams.com/cgi-
bin/public.sh/pubweb/publicSite.rsContinent=USA&screen=indexUSA (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
99. Sotheby's, Sotheby's Code of Business Conduct & Ethics,
http://www.sothebys.com/about/investorrelation/busethicsconduct.htnl (last visited Jun. 1I, 2007).
100. See Farrell & Alberge, supra note 3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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houses. The majority of what I did find concerning ethics, had to do with
anti-trust concerns, in response to the Sotheby's-Christie's price-fixing
scandal.'04 I asked one auction house representative what she thought her
company's ethical obligation is, specifically, concerning the illicit trade.
After some thought she responded, "Not to create or enhance a market of
items improperly dug up." That is an excellent place to start.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite increased legal regulation and cooperation on the part of the
auction houses, the black market trade in antiquities continues unabated.
Every year, new sites are opened up by looters, and the heritage of creator
cultures is further eroded by every lost artifact. A looted Djenne-jeno
terracotta figure slipping past Malian customs officials is not tragic because
the state just lost an item of "national importance," but because in the wake
of globalization and encroaching development, the Bozo people lose more
of their cultural selves every year.'0 5 The terracotta figure goes to auction
and ends up in an executive's curio cabinet, while the creator culture
struggles, and starves, and forgets from where they came. Viewed in this
light, the ethical concerns are bigger than a simple violation of foreign
patrimony laws.
Legal solutions to the thriving black market in antiquities do little to
address the social consequences of the trade, and sometimes work against
other ethical concerns. For as long as the auction houses define their ethical
behavior by way of their legal obligations, they will fail to comprehensively
manage risk, and will forgo opportunities to improve their brand image.
When auction houses implement ethical strategies supplementing those
focused on regulatory compliance, there will be two results. First, cultural
preservation interests will be furthered and creator cultures better protected,
because ethical initiatives address social concerns while those focused on
regulatory compliance do not. Second, auction houses will be better
equipped to combat bad press, restore their brand images, and manage the
risks associated with auctioning antiquities. In both ways, a supplementary
ethical framework is a tailored response to the crises of cultural preserva-
tion, borne of the illicit trade in cultural property.
104. See generally Appiah, supra note 78.
105. See id. (discussing Malian patrimony laws).
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